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JURISDICTION

Can Consent Waive Absolute Rights To An Article III Court?
by Ronald H. Filler

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
V.

William T. Schor
(Docket No. 85-621)

ContiCommodity Services, Inc.
V.

William T. Schor
(Docket No. 85-642)
Argued April29, 1986
Article III of the United States Constitution provides
that the 'judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish" and that the judges of these courts shall
serve "during good behavior," with compensation that
"shall not be diminished" during their tenure. These
provisions protect the role of the independent judiciary
and assure impartial adjudication in federal courts.
However, for over 150 years, tile Supreme Court has
granted Congress substantial flexibility to assign adjudicative tasks to legislative courts and other administrative
tribunals, created pursuant to its powers tinder Article I.
The Court must decide in this consolidated case
whether to apply an absolutist interpretation of Article
III or to extend this congressional flexibility to an administrative remedy which provides for substantive expertise and which was voluntarily elected by the party
not seeking the common law claim.
ISSUES
I. Whether the Commodity Futures Trading Commission which adjudicates, subjec to judicial review,
claims for money damages brought against commodity brokers by customers alleging a violation of the
Commodity Exchange Act, is precluded by Article III
of the Constitution from entertaining the broker's
state law couhterclaim arising out of the same transacRonald H. Filleris a partnerwith Vedder, Price, Kaufman &
Kammholz, 115 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60603-3980;
telephone (312) 781-2330 and is an Adjunct Professorof Law
and Directorof the Commodities Law Institute of lIT ChicagoKent College of Law.
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tion or occurrence, when the customer could have
brought the claim in an Article III court in the first
instance, but chose to proceed before the commission
instead.
2. Whether this case is distinguishable from Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. (458 U.S. 50
(1982)), in which both the initial proceeding and the
related state law claim were brought by the same
party, whereas in Schor the common law counterclaim
was brought by a party, which by statute and regulation, could not have initiated the CFTC administrative proceeding.
FACTS
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974, which significantly amended the Commodity
Exchange Act, established a new federal administrative
agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) to monitor and regulate futures transactions
and activities and to protect users of the futures markets. These same amendments established an administrative proceeding, known as reparations, which permits
commodity customers to seek damages and other relief
against their commodity brokerage firms, known as futures commission merchants. The CFTC has promulgated extensive regulations involving reparations which
provide, in part, several of the same procedural rights
conferred on parties in federal courts.
Pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act and
CFTC regulations, a reparation proceeding may only be
initiated by a customer against a futures commission
merchant, broker or other commodity professional
which is registered in some capacity with the CFTC.
These proceedings are commenced when the aggrieved
customer files a complaint. The brokerage firm then
files an answer. Upon receiving the complaint and answer, a division of the CFTC determines whether to
forward the matter to the hearing stage. Depending on
the size of the requested damages claim, an actual hearing before an administrative law judge (AL) occurs or a
summary proceeding based on the written record will be
decided by the ALJ. Most reparation actions, however,
result in a hearing.
The ALJ's decision is subject to review by the CFTC.
whose decision is reviewable by the appropriate United
States court of appeals.
The reparation proceeding, as noted above, may
only be initiated by the commodity customer against a
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brokerage firm or broker. In the alternative, the customer may choose to bring such an action, based on a
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, in federal
court. In either forum, the brokerage firm may bring a
counterclaim against the customer for a debit balance
which may exist in the customer's account. This debit
balance occurs if trading losses in the customer's account
exceed the equity or amount invested by the customer.
Unlike other forms of investment, futures transactions,
due to their leverage feature, provide for greater risk
and reward to the customer.
Quite often, the brokerage firm initiates a collection
action in either state or federal court to recover this
debit balance award. In such actions, the customer may
file a counter claim against the brokerage firm, alleging
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act or CFTC
regulations. Typically, the alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and the debit balance claim arise
out of the same transactions.
In this case, William Schor had filed a reparation
complaint with the CFTC. Before ContiCommodity
Services, Inc. (Conti), Schor's brokerage firm, had received notice the reparation action was filed, Conti filed
a diversity action in federal court to recover the debit
balance in Schor's account. Schor filed a counterclaim in
that federal action, alleging, among other things, that
Conti had violated the Commodity Exchange Act. Schor
also moved to dismiss or stay the federal action on the
grounds that the reparation proceeding would fully and
completely resolve and adjudicate all of the rights of the
parties. In support of this motion, Schor argued that the
continuation of both proceedings would require him, at
great expense, to litigate the same issues in two forums.
Although the federal district court declined to stay or
dismiss the federal action, Conti voluntarily dismissed
the federal court action and filed a debit balance counterclaim in the crC reparation proceeding.
The ALl found for Conti on both the claim and
counterclaim. The CFTC denied Schor's application for
review of the ALJ's decision. Schor then filed a petition
for review of tile CFTC's order in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
After briefing and argument, the court of appeals, relying on tile Northern Pipeline Co. case, dismissed Conti's
counterclaim oil the ground that the CFTC lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate common law counterclaims.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the CFTC, filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court
granted the petition and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. (87 L.Ed.2d 409) (1985); Preview 198485 term, pp. 437-39), which held that an administrative
arbitration scheme did not contravene Article 111. On
remand, the court of appeals reinstated its prior judgment (770 F.2d 211 (1985)).
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Since the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, several thousand reparation cases have been
filed with the CFTC by commodity customers against
their commodity brokerage firms and brokers. In its
1985 Annual Report, the CFTC reported the following
statistics with respect to its reparations caseload for its
1985 fiscal year:
Cases Pending-Beginning of
1985 Fiscal Year
Cases Received
Cases Remanded
Cases Reconsidered
Cases Stayed
TOTAL
Disposition of Cases:
Initial Decisions
Second Initial Decisions
Summary Dispositions
Settlements
Default Decisions
Dismissals for Cause
TOTAL DISPOSITIONS

601
'114
42
43
2
1,102
210
25
6
181
63
63
548

TOTAL PENDING-End of 19,35 Fiscal Year 554
While there are no statistics as to how many reparation cases involve a counterclaim for a debit balance,
several clearly do. Therefore, one major significance of
the Schor case will be the economic impact on the parties
to a commodities case which involves both a claim and
counterclaim. If the Supreme Court affirms the court of
appeals' decision, thus eviscerating the statutory scheme
designed by Congress, then both parties could be required to adjudicate their respective claims in separate
forums, once the commodity customer elects the reparation proceeding over federal district courts.
Each commodity customer clearly has several alternatives for relief in a claim against idleged fraudulent
practices committed by a brokerage firm or broker. One
is reparation, which has been a very popular approach
over the past ten years. A second alternative is arbitration, before a commodity exchange, the National Futures Association or an independent organization, such
as the American Arbitration Association. This approach
has increased in popularity in recent years. The third is
federal action. The 1983 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act adopted section 22 which provides for
a private right of action for certain fraudulent activities,
including those alleged in tile Schor case. Prior to these
amendments, there was uncertainty whether the reparation procedui'es, established in the 197,t amendments to
the Commodity Exchange Act, preempted the right to
seek relief in federal courts. The Supreme Court in
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (456
1I.S. 353 (1982)), held that a private right of action did
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exist under the Commodity Exchange Act, even prior to
the 1983 amendments which adopted section 22.
Clearly, then, Schor could have elected to pursue his
claim in an Article III court. In fact, Conti had filed a
diversity action in federal court to collect the outstanding debit balance in Schor's account. Schor filed a counterclaim in that federal action, alleging the same
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act as set forth
in his reparation complaint. For whatever reason, Conti
volunteered to dismiss the federal action and file a counterclain for the debit balance in the reparation proceeding. The issue, therefore, is whether a person who could
have proceeded in an Article II1 court, but voluntarily
elects an administrative remedy, has waived rights to
adjudicate the co-nnon law counterclaim, by implied
consent, in an Article III court.
Notwithstanding this election, Schor, in the reparation proceeding, received many of the procedural benefits of a federal action; in particular, discovery, albeit
more limited in nature, and a hearing. Obviously, tile
ALI does not have the tenure and salary protectives
accorded federal district judges under Article Ill. On
the other hand, the ALl possesses intricate knowledge
and expertise on very complex financial transactions,
known as financial futures, which were traded in Schor's
account at Conti. Many of the inherent limitations in
federal actions involving commodity cases involve this
lack of expertise and understanding of the underlying
investment by the trier of fact.
A fundamental purpose of the provisions of Article
III is to ensure impartial adjudication by independent
jivdiciary. The question is whether Article Ill should be
interpreted without exception on common law claims or
whether a party can waive this Article III protection by
voluntarily electing to seek relief in a non-Article Ill
court, especially when such party can seek judicial review of the non-Article III court decision.
Unlike tile Northern Pipeline case, in which tile same
party sought both the statutory and common law claims,
different parties in Schor sought the statutory and comnon law claims. Therefore, another significant issue is
whether tile party which brought the non-Article Ill
proceeding can deny the other party from seeking relief
on common law grounds which arose out of tile same
transaction, especially when such other party was prevented by law from initially using this non-Article III
forun.
These counterclaims, subject to CFTC adjudication,
would be compulsory counterclaims in federal court.
Thus, the Court must also weigh tle protections of
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Article III versus piecemeal litigation which could become quite expensive for the parties to litigate in different forums. In fact, the Court must consider whether
the procedural protections of CFTC reparations outweigh the protections of a state court action, which is an
alternative forum that the brokerage firm may use to
recover the debit balance rather than in the federal
courts. State court judges, like ALIs, do not possess tile
tenure and salary protections that exist under Article
III.
ARGUMENTS
For William T. Schor (Counsel, Leslie J. Carson, Jr., 1004
Robinson Bldg., 42 S. 15th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102;
telephone (215) 568-1587
I. The court of appeals below correctly held that !ile
Commodity Exchange Act does not authorize reparations awards on state law counterclaims.
2. Article 111 bars a grant of jurisdiction to tile CFTC to
adjudicate state law claims.
A. Congress may not depart from the understanding
inherent in Article III that federal judicial power
over state law claims would be exercised by independentjudges.
B. The CFTC has not advanced a legitimate basis for
giving jurisdiction over state law claims to judges
unprotected by the provisions of Article Il1.
For Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Counsel,
Kenneth Al. Raisler, 2033 K Street, NW, Washington, DC
20581; telephone (202) 254-9880)
1, When a customer chooses to bring a reparations complaint against a broker before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the CFTC's adjudication,
subject tojudicial review, of the broker's counterclaim
arising out of the same transaction giving rise to the
complaint, is consistent with Article 111.
A. The Commodity Exchange Act authorizes the
CFTC to entertain a counterclaim that arises out of
the same transaction that forns the basis for the
underlying reparations complaint.
B. The CFTC's adjudication of counterclaims in these
circumstances is necessary to achieve the purposes
of the reparations program.
C. The CFTC's adjudication of Conti's counterclaim
is consistent with Article III because Schor consented to that adjudication.
D. Article IIl does not preclude the CFTC from exercising ancillary jurisdiction over counterclaims that
arise out of the same transaction as a reparations
complaint.
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